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
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Executive Summary

Title: A comparative study of the initial reconstruction efforts of Japan and Iraq

Author: Major Mario A. Washington, United States Army

Thesis: Security, planning, unity of effort, and personnel are critical for successful PCR because they provide the necessary structure, focus and expertise to understand challenging and often dangerous efforts involving reconstruction.

Discussion: General MacArthur and Ambassador Bremer's reconstruction situations were similar in many regards. They were both dealing with countries that were broken and coming off humiliating defeats at the hands of U.S. led coalitions. Both reconstruction efforts had common challenges they had to overcome: security, democratization, military demobilization, economic and infrastructure development. They both had policies to guide them and historical references to draw on; however, the initial stages of reconstruction of Japan and Iraq were quite different as were the outcomes.

Conclusion: Undoubtedly, conflicts will continue; as Haiti demonstrates other than war reconstruction will continue as well. The same principles will continue to apply: establish civil security, establish civil control, restore essential services, support governance and lastly support economic infrastructure development.ⁱ Within the framework of the essential tasks, planning, unity of effort and resources will continue to be paramount to success. The United States is a world leader and will continue to provide relief and stability to different regions of the world. The lessons learned in Japan and Iraq will continue to serve as valuable resources when planning for future reconstruction projects.

¹ Headquarter U.S. Army. *Stability Operations FM 3-07*, Department of the Army, (Washington DC: Headquarters U.S. Army, October 2008). 2-5

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Introduction

The United States Military has been involved in post-conflict reconstruction (PCR) since the Civil War. They have been involved to different degrees in Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. Japan is often thought of as the gold standard of PCR. Iraq's reconstruction effort generally has not been viewed as successful, especially the initial phase of the reconstruction effort. Japan and Iraq were both comprehensive efforts that aimed to engineer major social, political, and economic reconstruction. Japan's successful reconstruction effort demonstrated that democracy was transferable; societies could, under certain circumstances, be encouraged to transform themselves; and maintain this transformation over time.ⁱ Iraq's challenges do not dispute the facts established by Japan's success; moreover, Iraq validates the importance of the Department of State Post Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks. After comparing the first year of reconstruction efforts of General MacArthur and Ambassador Bremer to the Department of State Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks, what are the lessons learned from both efforts and how will they benefit the initial phase of future reconstruction efforts?

General MacArthur and Ambassador Bremer both brought varied and robust skill sets to the reconstruction efforts of Japan and Iraq respectively. General MacArthur experienced occupation before when he helped occupy the Rhineland in 1919 after World War I. He also drew on the lessons he learned from his father, who had been military governor of the Philippines following the Spanish – American War.ⁱⁱ Having

commanded in Asia for ten years prior to becoming Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP), General MacArthur was aware of issues concerning the occupation of Japan.

During his 23-year State Department career, Ambassador Bremer served as special assistant or executive assistant to six secretaries of state. He had been ambassador to the Netherlands from 1983 to 1986 and then the State Department's Ambassador at Large for Counter-Terrorism. He left government service in the early 1990s, worked as an executive in Henry Kissinger's consulting firm, and then became chairman and chief executive officer of Marsh Crisis Consulting.ⁱⁱⁱ Ambassador Bremer was never involved in an occupation nor did he have any experience with Iraq.

General MacArthur and Ambassador Bremer's reconstruction situations were similar in many regards. They were both dealing with countries that were broken and coming off humiliating defeats at the hands of U.S. led coalitions. Both reconstruction efforts had common challenges they had to overcome: security, democratization, military demobilization, economic and infrastructure development. They both had policies to guide them and historical references to draw on; however, the initial stages of reconstruction of Japan and Iraq were quite different as were the outcomes.

This paper will use The Department Of State Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks which consist of: Security, Governance and Participation, Humanitarian Assistance and Social-Well Being, Justice and Reconciliation, Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure as a guideline for the comparison of Japan and Iraq's reconstruction efforts and to establish the lessons learned and how to apply them to future PCR efforts. Security, planning, unity of effort, and personnel are critical for successful PCR because

they provide the necessary structure, focus and expertise to understand challenging and often dangerous efforts involving reconstruction.

Japan overview

Japan surrendered on 15 August 1945. More than 30,000 Allied prisoners of war were in need of food, medical care, and evacuation. Most of Japan's factory equipment was earmarked for reparations, military stockpiles were being looted or hidden, and the Bank of Japan printed excessive currency to pay off government obligations causing rampant inflation. Allied bombings left nearly 9 million people or 30 percent of the population homeless.^{iv} The national food distribution system had totally collapsed causing wide spread hunger and starvation. Nearly 6.5 million Japanese citizens needed to be repatriated; 3.5 million troops and 3 million civilians were dispersed throughout Japan's former empire or other overseas locations.^v There were issues concerning how to deal with the emperor, the existing government and the political and bureaucratic apparatus, and the identification and prosecution of war criminals. Japan was a broken country.

In July of 1945, at the Potsdam Conference, the Allied powers agreed the Japanese must comply with the following: Unconditional surrender, a purge of the leadership that had advocated global conquest, an allied occupation until a new order was established and Japan's war-making power was destroyed, the disbandment of Japan's empire, military disarmament, prosecution of war criminals, establishment of freedom of speech, religion, thought, and respect for basic human rights; and reduction of economic capacity to prevent rearmament.^{vi}

In addition to the Potsdam Conference agreement, General MacArthur, Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP) and his staff had two other documents to guide their work, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), directive 1380/15 and the State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC).^{vii} As important, President Truman stated that General MacArthur was superior to both the Japanese Emperor and government. This allowed General MacArthur to act unilaterally concerning decisions and eliminated a lot of bureaucracy. This single decision was as important as any other decision. It allowed General MacArthur to govern in a totalitarian manner. His decisions were not vetted through other allied countries or General Officers. General MacArthur's policies allowed for latitude when it came to decision-making and was very beneficial to his reconstruction efforts.

Security

The first and most important task is establishing security. Establishing security involves providing for the safety of the host nation and its population, including protection from internal and external threats; it is essential to providing a safe and secure environment. Security includes a diverse set of activities. These range from enforcing peace agreements to conducting disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. Until a legitimate civil government can assume responsibility for the security sector, United States Military and Coalition Forces perform the tasks associated with civil security. At the same time, they help develop host-nation security and police forces. Normally, the responsibility for establishing and maintaining civil security belongs to military forces from the onset of operations through transition, when host-nation security and police

forces assume this role.^{viii}

The demilitarization and disarmament of Japan was perhaps the most successful of all the tasks during the reconstruction efforts. With the Japanese Government leading the demobilization process 5 million servicemen were demobilized by October 15, 1945 and extraordinarily, by the end of 1945 the Japanese Armed Forces failed to exist.^{ix} Paramilitary and ultranationalist organizations were also disbanded. Subsequently, demilitarization was enshrined in the new Japanese constitution. Article 9, the so call “no war” clause, pledged that Japan renounced war and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. The role of the U.S. forces in demobilization and disarmament was to provide oversight and surveillance.^x The Allied Occupation Force consisted of 290,000 men, 250,000 were U.S., while the other 40,000 were the British Commonwealth Force. The Allies enforced initial security to ensure the demobilization process was seamless with no major security issues.^{xi}

The Japanese used land reform as one of the main sources of employment for demobilizing soldiers. Land reform, it was believed, could ease the economic consequences of immediate demobilization and reduce future agrarian unrest among poor tenant farmers and small landholders. Even today, land reform is seen as the single most important factor for quelling rural discontent and promoting political stability in the early post-war period.^{xii}

Governance and Participation

Tasks in the governance and participation sector address the need to establish effective, legitimate political and administrative institutions and infrastructure.

Governance is the state's ability to serve the citizens through the rules, processes, and behavior by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in a society, including the representative participatory decision-making processes typically guaranteed under inclusive, constitutional authority.

Effective governance involves establishing rules and procedures for political decision-making, strengthening public sector management and administrative institutions and practices, providing public services in an effective and transparent manner, and providing civil administration that supports lawful private activity and enterprise. Participation includes procedures that actively and openly involve the local populace in forming their government structures and policies that, in turn, encourage public debate and the generation and exchange of new ideas.^{xiii}

Response efforts that seek to build local governance and participation capacity ensure host-nation responsibility for these processes. Even when civilians are deprived of authority or the right to vote, they must be encouraged to take the lead in rebuilding their own government. This lead is essential to establishing successful, enduring host-nation government institutions. Even when external actors perform certain governance functions temporarily, this process to build host-nation capacity—complemented by a comprehensive technical assistance program—is vital to long-term success.^{xiv}

General MacArthur's decisions to keep the Emperor in place and utilize the mostly intact Japanese government were controversial; however, they paid major dividends regarding the initial phases of reconstruction. Keeping the Emperor and Japanese Government in place allowed General MacArthur to keep a Japanese face on governance. The Emperor had to disavow his divine powers and was merely a figurehead;

nonetheless, the Japanese still held him in high regard and his support of the SCAP directives was important to the democratization process in Japan.

One of the first decisions that the Japanese government made concerning democratization was to purge politicians, police and military officers. The men whom the United States wanted purged were those in whose past record could be detected any or all of the marks of militarism, as defined by SCAP. Some were: participation in, or support of military aggression, overseas imperialism, ultra-nationalist propaganda, and assuming leadership over other Asiatic races.^{xv} While SCAP issued directives guiding the process, the Japanese Government took the necessary legislative and bureaucratic action to implement the purges. To avoid opposition it was important that the Japanese Government appear to be purging itself. The purge led to the removal of 210,000 Japanese, .29 percent of the population.^{xvi} Nevertheless, the purges did not seriously undermine the strength of conservative political forces that continued to control the political process throughout most of the occupation. Bureaucrats, responsible for the implementation, largely escaped the purge. The 1,809 bureaucrats who were eventually purged represented less than one percent of the total.^{xvii}

One of the most important and lasting contributions to the democratization process was the revisions of the Meiji Constitution of 1889. The Japanese Government initially tried revising the constitution. The Japanese felt that the Meiji Constitution should be restored to its original form, not replaced. It would not be necessary nor desirable to tamper drastically with the powers of the Emperor, who was to remain the unchallenged head of state, "supreme and inviolable."^{xviii} General MacArthur did agree with the view of the Japanese government. Therefore, he directed the SCAP Government

Section to draft a constitution. General MacArthur urged extreme haste due to his desire to get the Japanese-endorsed draft out to the public prior to the Far Eastern Commission (FEC), which had jurisdiction over constitutional issues, before they convened for a meeting in late February 1946.^{xix} General MacArthur did not want the FEC to have any influence over the constitution. General MacArthur saw FEC involvement (which entailed Russian involvement) as a real threat to the country's freedom.^{xx} The government section completed the entire document in two weeks and presented a draft to the Japanese on 19 February.^{xxi} The Japanese would present the document to the people to ensure that in fact the outcome was of the Japanese governments own efforts.^{xxii} The new draft reduced the Emperor from a sovereign to a mere symbol of the state and placed the Diet (governing body) as representatives of the will of the people, at the center of national sovereignty. Equal rights were granted to women with regard to property, marriage, and other aspects of family life.^{xxiii} The constitution has not been changed to date.

Educational reform was another means for democratization and demilitarization. The focus was on removal of all emperor worship and militarism from the classroom and curriculum. Teachers and students went as far as ripping out or lining through offending language in textbooks. Saluting the flag, singing the national anthem and bowing to the emperor's picture were prohibited.^{xxiv}

General MacArthur set the conditions for Japanese self-governance. He ensured they were involved in the decision making process, while ensuring they stayed on message. General MacArthur allowed the Japanese government to make decisions and implement policies, and only stepped in when he felt there was an issue. This indirect

nature of governance by SCAP's masked its true power.^{xxv}

General MacArthur used former officer and enlisted Japanese soldiers to fill out his staff due in part to his staff lacking the language, cultural, and technical capability. General MacArthur understood the importance of having Allied and Japanese experts implementing self-governance policies.^{xxvi} A good example is, T.A Bisson, an American economic expert, who possessed a vast amount of Far East experience and played a major role in the economic policies.^{xxvii} That said, General MacArthur's personnel decisions and handling of delicate government issues demonstrate how a well organized structure with experienced personnel who possess the right job skills can have a positive affect on the initial phases of governance.

Humanitarian Assistance and Social Well-Being

Conflict and disaster significantly stress how well the state can provide for the essential, immediate humanitarian needs of its people. The institutions of security and governance that enable the effective functioning of public services often fail first, leading to widespread internal strife and humanitarian crisis. In some areas, the intense competition for limited resources may explode into full-blown conflict, possibly leaving pervasive starvation, disease, and death as obvious outward indications of a fragile state in crisis.^{xxviii} Any intervention effort is incomplete if it fails to alleviate immediate suffering. Generally, this suffering is understood to include the immediate need for water, food, shelter, emergency health care, and sanitation. However, solutions that focus on ensuring sustainable access to these basic needs are also necessary to prevent the recurrence of systemic failures while assuring the social well-being of the people.^{xxix}

The immediate problem of feeding the population had to be General MacArthur's first priority. The national food distribution system had totally collapsed, and many faced hunger and starvation.^{xxx} General MacArthur worried that his democratization program would be undermined by hunger, so he lobbied congress for more assistance. He argued that the United States would either have to send more money or troops; congress understood his argument and sent additional funding.^{xxxi}

Although none of the basic policy documents called for the repatriation of Japanese civilians and servicemen to Japan, SCAP collaborated with the Japanese Government to return 6,500,000 Japanese and about 1,250,000 foreign nationals to their homes.^{xxxii} Japan was the main element of the repatriation process, once again putting a Japanese face on a governmental process. Another area where General MacArthur proved noteworthy was starting a vaccination program. SCAP vaccinated for smallpox and tuberculosis, which both were reduced considerably as a result. These diseases had been endemic to Japan at one time or other, and epidemics had plagued the country well into the 20th century. Dysentery was almost wiped out, as were typhoid and paratyphoid.^{xxxiii}

The one essential service that was a point of contention was shelter. The Japanese government was responsible for housing for U.S. troops and not the U.S. Government; this impeded progress for the housing of the local population.^{xxxiv} Overall the United States' ability to restore essential services in the initial phase of reconstruction had a positive impact on the PCR effort.

Justice and Reconciliation

The justice and reconciliation sector encompasses far more than policing, civil law and order, and the court systems of a state. Within the sector, efforts provide for a fair, impartial, and accountable justice system while ensuring an equitable means to reconcile past crimes and abuse arising from conflict or disaster. Tasks most closely associated with justice focus on reestablishing a fair and impartial judiciary and effective justice system. This system ensures public safety and helps to resolve disputes and enforce contracts. Those tasks relating to reconciliation address grievances and crimes, past and present, in hopes of forging a peaceful future for an integrated society.^{xxxv}

Successful interventions address the most critical gaps in capability and capacity as soon as possible. The initial response forces that immediately account for vital issues of justice and reconciliation typically maintain the initiative against subversive and criminal elements seeking to fill those gaps. Host-nation involvement in planning, oversight, and monitoring of justice and reconciliation sector reforms is essential.^{xxxvi} The justice and reconciliation sector closely relates to the security and governance sectors; activities in one sector often complement or reinforce efforts in another. These relationships are further reinforced by the inseparable nature of the tasks subordinate to each sector, which reflects the dynamic interaction between security and justice. Due to the close relationships among the activities and functions that comprise the security, governance, and justice and reconciliation sectors, failure to act quickly in one sector can lead to the loss of momentum and gains in the other sectors.^{xxxvii}

Whom to prosecute for war crimes was one of the most controversial issues during the initial phase of reconstruction. Emperor Hirohito was the central figure concerning the controversy. Former Prime Minister Hideki Tojo and twenty-four other prominent

Japanese men were designated Class A criminals. Seven were hanged, and the rest received long prison sentences.^{xxxviii} Not prosecuting the Emperor had a negative effect on relations with neighboring China. The Chinese believed the Emperor was the principal symbol of feudal prestige and unrepresentative power and should be removed.^{xxxix} Nevertheless, not prosecuting the Emperor had a positive effect on the initial phase of reconstruction. The first postwar Japanese Premier, Yoshida Shigeru, stated that General MacArthur's respectful attitude toward the Emperor was the most important factor in making the initial occupation a success as well as bringing Japan back to a democratic stance.^{xl} Beneath Emperor Hirohito's mild, inoffensive, "human" façade cultivated so assiduously for him by SCAP and the Imperial Household, there seems to have lain a genuine commitment to peace, which played an important part in forging the national consensus that has so influenced the positive course of post-war Japan.^{xli}

General MacArthur's use of the existing Japanese judiciary, as well as laws enacted by the new constitution helped facilitate civil control. One act of note that was particularly beneficial to civil control was the new police law. The police law SCAP enacted aimed at decentralization and democratization of the police units under the authority of locally elected commissions.^{xlii} A national rural police force was organized for areas too small to finance their own public safety needs and certain other police functions are to be retained in the hands of the national government.^{xliii}

Japan provides a classic example of how civil security and civil control go hand in hand. The permissive environment allowed for the facilitation of the rule of law, which helped with maintaining a lawful society.

Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure

The economy is among the first elements of society to exhibit stress and ultimately fracture as conflict, disaster, and internal strife overwhelms the government. Signs of economic stress include rapid increases in inflation, uncontrolled escalation of public debt, and a general decline in the state's ability to provide for the well being of the people. Infrastructure development complements and reinforces efforts to stabilize the economy. It focuses on the society's physical aspects that enable the state's economic viability.^{xliv}

The Japanese economy was another controversial subject during the occupation due to issues over worker rights. The focus initially was on dissolving the large business combines (*zaibatsu*), expanding worker's rights, and instituting comprehensive land reform. The dissolving of the *zaibatsu* was considered to be instrumental to the reconstruction of Japan from a democratic and economic perspective. In 1945 ten major families controlled seventy-five percent of industry, finance, and commerce in Japan. The integration of these few with government was complete and their influence upon governmental policies inordinate and set the course which ultimately led to war and destruction.^{xlv} The continued overconcentration of economic wealth and power in the hands of a few families was perceived to be antidemocratic and dangerous.^{xlvi} In the end, eighty-three *zaibatsu* were broken up into their component parts, antimonopoly laws were passed to prevent their reestablishment. But their financial linkages were left intact, and action against 1200 other companies was abandoned.^{xlvii}

Possibly the most important decision made concerning the economy and security was land reform. Land reform had far reaching effects; it created jobs for the demobilizing military and support from the peasants.^{xlvi} Land reform was designed to undermine the political and economic power of landlords, who were viewed as the bulwark of feudalism and militarism. It gave farmers a stake in the preservation of the emerging democratic status quo. This played heavily in quelling rural discontent and promoting political stability.^{xli} In the end, by not dissolving all the zaibatsu the growth of the Japanese economy was as much about what did not happen as what happened. General MacArthur had a coherent economic plan, so when issues came up like the zaibatsu he was able to adjust to the situation. Japan's economic miracle in the 1950s and 1960s; from a state of economic ruin Japan has now become the third largest industrial machine in the world and has one of the worlds strongest economies. The export boom in domestic products started during the occupation and accelerated after the Korean War.¹

Overall, SCAP did an excellent job in comparison to The Department of State Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks. SCAP performed exceptionally in security, which allowed for flexibility in the other essential tasks. SCAP did excellent in Governance even with the delicate issues with the Emperor and purges, the revised constitution has not been changed to date. SCAP performed well in Humanitarian Assistance and Social Well-Being the vaccination program and repatriation were noteworthy, nevertheless, the effort was on par with other PCR efforts. SCAP did an excellent job in Justice and Reconciliation, although not prosecuting Emperor had negative and positive effects, the positive outweighed the negative. The changes to the

police law also proved beneficial to civil control. Finally, Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure, SCAP performed well, the break-up of the *zaibatsu* proved to be controversial and the outcome of them ambiguous; nonetheless, SCAP planted the seed for a future world leader economically. SCAP's performance concerning the essential tasks demonstrates the importance of security, planning, unity of effort, and resources to successful PCR.

Iraq Overview

In 1979, Saddam Hussein seized power in Iraq. He ruled Iraq for the next twenty-four years at a high cost to the people of Iraq. In 1980, Saddam launched an eight year war with Iran, that cost a half million Iraqi deaths. The war decimated a generation of young men, and roiled tensions between the regime's Sunni Arab elite and their Shi'a and Kurdish countrymen.^{li} In 1990, Saddam invaded Kuwait, which lead to the Gulf War. Saddam was quickly defeated by a broad coalition of forces. By the time coalition forces took Baghdad in April 2003, the impact of multiple wars, severe international sanctions, and repressive rule had left Iraq a broken country.

Initial responsibility for overseeing reconstruction in post-conflict Iraq fell to the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA). Established in early 2003, ORHA was headed by Lieutenant General Jay M. Garner, U.S. Army (ret.). By June 2003, ORHA had been replaced, or subsumed, by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which was led by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III.^{lii} The CPA was established approximately one month after United States and coalition forces took control of Baghdad in Iraq on April 9, 2003. Ambassador Bremer's authority derived from UN

Security Council Resolution 1483. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was a multinational organization with a minority of personnel from countries represented in the military coalition. As a practical matter, however, the CPA was run by the United States and took instructions only from Washington.^{liii} CPA Regulation Number 1 guided Ambassador Bremer and no other official documents from Washington. Ambassador Bremer's chain of command was never fully understood. As the President's envoy he could report to the President; however, the CPA fell under the Department of Defense, which necessitated guidance from Donald Rumsfeld. The National Security Agency would play a role as well when issues about length of the reconstruction came in to play. Lastly, Ambassador Bremer did not have direct control over the military forces, which had a major part of the reconstruction mission. This convoluted chain of command presented issues when timely decisions were needed.

CPA Regulation 1 established the power vested in the CPA. It stated the CPA "shall exercise powers of government temporarily in order to provide for the effective administration of Iraq" for an undefined transitional period.^{liv} This order also allowed Ambassador Bremer "all executive, legislative and judicial authority necessary to achieve CPA's mission."

According to the Special Investigation Services CPA's mission was:

To restore conditions of security and stability, to create conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own political future, including by advancing efforts to restore and establish national and local institutions for representative governance and facilitating economic recovery, sustainable reconstruction and development.^{lv}

CPA's mission was very ambitious and expansive. CPA's guidance, plan, and resources were not in line with the ambitious mission. Secretary of State, Colin Powell stated: "Jerry –God bless him- he was never given a set of coordinated instructions from the Administration. He went in pretty much on his own."⁵⁶

Security

The lack of coordination and support translated into an inability to provide security in the period immediately following the invasion.

James Dobbins stated in an interview with Frontline:

Because we didn't protect them, we never gained their loyalty. An occupied people look to their occupier for one thing, and it's not electricity; it's not air conditioning -- it's security. And if you don't provide them security, it doesn't make any difference what else you're doing for them. They're not going to collaborate, because it's too dangerous.⁵⁷

On May 23, 2003 Ambassador Bremer signed CPA Order 2, "Dissolution of Entities" or disbanding of the Iraqi security forces.⁵⁸ He did not make the decision on his own; Donald Rumsfeld was aware of the decision and to a lesser extent personnel in the White House and other agencies.⁵⁹ Even though the decision was conceived in Washington, those not aware of the order is a distinguished list: Secretary Powell, Dr. Rice, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commanders on the ground, as well as leading Iraqis. Ambassador Bremer's first three major orders were made in a Washington D.C vacuum and had major second and third order effects.

CPA Order 2 "Dissolution of Entities," put every member of Iraq's army, air

force, navy, and air defense force, as well as the Republican Guard, the Special Republican Guard, the Directorate of Military Intelligence, and the Emergency Forces—some 500,000 men—immediately out of work, many without any compensation. Although the roughly 300,000 conscripts could receive a small termination payment, no soldier with the rank of colonel or above was eligible for either a termination payment or a pension.^{lx} This is the opposite of what the essential tasks recommend. It is vitally important to have employment or a means of support in place for the demobilizing military. LTG Garner, stated:

The problem you have there is, with that order, you suddenly tell somewhere between 300,000 and 400,000 soldiers that they're out of jobs, and they're all still armed. Now, whether they became terrorists, we don't know. But to me, that's just not a good beginning. Sun Tzu says you don't want to go to bed at night with more enemies than you woke up with that morning. Well, we went to bed with a whole lot more enemies that night than we had begun the day with.^{lxi}

This was a major issue, what to do with all the men who had weapons, no job and no discernible means of income. The lack of security had devastating effects on all aspects of CPA's reconstruction effort. The lack of success in every essential task can be traced back to the lack of security. As successful as SCAP was in establishing civil security was as unsuccessful as CPA was. The element of providing security was not entirely CPA's mission, as the U.S. Military was mainly responsible for the task of securing the Iraqi people. The issue was the policies implemented by the CPA had drastic and negative effects on the conditions; the policies in effect set the insurgency in motion. Major General David Petraeus later said that the order to disband the army

sparked an anti-Coalition sentiment that fueled the nascent insurgency in Iraq, igniting nationalist impulses against “the occupiers.” Petraeus believed that the order created “tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of additional enemies of the Coalition.”^{lxii} Security must be established before taking on major reconstruction efforts.

Governance and Participation

The CPA came and they were obsessed [with] decentralized government...I kept telling them, before you devolve power, you have to have power to devolve. We don't have power to devolve.

Samir Sumaida'ie
Iraqi Governing Council Member (2003-2004)

CPA Order 1 eliminated all Baath Party structures and banned “Senior Party Members,” those in the top four ranks of the party, from serving in Iraq’s public sector. The order also provided for the immediate dismissal of anyone in the top three layers of management in any government institution (including ministries, state-owned enterprise, universities, and hospitals) if he or she had been a full member of the Baath Party. The order provided that Bremer or any of his designee could grant exceptions on a case-by-case basis.^{lxiii} One of the major issues with the order was Ambassador Bremer did not work with other agencies prior to publishing the order, particularly the military.

LTG Ricardo Sanchez, remarked,

“ Essentially, it eliminated the entire government and civic capacity of the nation. Organizations involving justice, defense, interior, communications, schools, universities, and hospitals were all either completely shut down or severely crippled, because anybody with any experience was now out of a job.”^{lxiv}

Ambassador Bremer failed to put an Iraqi face on reforms. The CPA did not

allow Iraqis the ability to influence the decision making process, which had a negative effect on the Iraqis participating in the process. Isam al- Khafaji, member of the Iraqi Reconstruction Development Council (IRDC) stated in an interview:

We reached a point where we started asking ourselves: are we informers or advisors? Being an adviser means that you sit around the committee table devising the orders, but we were implementing orders without being consulted in their decision. So we were not seen as advisers, let alone as decision-makers. All the big decisions dissolving the Iraqi army and the security apparatus, privatization, oil policy, the banking system, the restructuring of the media-were all made by the CPA behind closed doors.^{lxv}

This lack of consultation and inclusion, frustrated U.S. efforts to restore governance across Iraq. The CPA initially concentrated on finding suitable candidates for the new Iraqi Governing Council and on re- starting the national ministries.

Ambassador Bremer issued a series of orders to improve governance by reforming Saddam-era institutions and creating new organizations to combat corruption. At the same time, the U.S. military and USAID launched an array of projects to establish regional and local councils across Iraq and to encourage community participation in governance, because Iraqis were excluded from planning these initiatives, their implementation faltered.^{lxvi} Ambassador Bremer admitted this mistake in an interview with Frontline saying:

The implementation is where I went wrong. I knew that we, the foreigners, were going to have a hard time making the kind of fine distinctions that de-Baathification policy required. I said, 'I need to turn it over to Iraqis.' The mistake

I made was turning it over to the Governing Council. I should have turned it over instead to a judicial body of some kind.^{lxvii}

De-Baatification had to take place to eliminate the overpowering presence of Saddam Hussein. Still, the program's implementation frustrated near term goals of building popular support for the new government with the Iraqi people. Ambassador Bremer's decision on De-Baatification was not his alone, but was made without sufficient input from those most familiar with Iraqi governing structures. Elements of the military and government were vehemently against the depth that CPA Order number 1 effected. Much like CPA Order number 2, the second and third order affects permeated throughout the other essential tasks. Samir Sumaida'ie, a Sunni who became a member of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) and then served as Iraq's Minister of Interior, criticized the order for focusing on removing people rather than getting rid of an outmoded ideology. "The whole thing was applied in a very negative way," he said. "It was far too wide-ranging, and as a result, created a backlash. There were a lot of people who were just ordinary people who joined the party simply because they wanted to survive."

Humanitarian Assistance and Social Well-Being

U.S. officials were shocked at the state in which they found Iraq's electric, water health and education systems. When Ambassador Bremer arrived in May 2003, electricity production averaged just 711 megawatts per day. At the time the CPA transferred sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government, production had risen to 3,621 megawatts. This significant improvement in one year was still well below the 6,000

megawatts the CPA had set as its ultimate goal. The CPA effort to get electricity production up to 4,400 megawatts succeeded briefly in October 2003, but the short-term actions taken to meet that target proved counter-productive to long-term progress.^{lxviii} In the short term, the decision caused senior officials at the Pentagon and the White House to fixate on the metric rather than moving forward on multifaceted improvements of the system. In the long term, the focus created a perennial desire to judge electricity sector performance on one metric—whether current output exceeded prewar levels.^{lxix}

In other areas the CPA was more successful. It raised the delivery of health and educational services well beyond prewar levels. Spending on public health increased under the CPA by 3,200 percent. Thousands of schools were refurbished, and textbooks rewritten to eliminate Ba'athist content.^{lxx} Oil production, telecommunications also improved to near pre-invasion levels. Despite these gains, the lack of security in many parts of the country could be traced to essential services. The governor of Karbala, Akram al-Yasiri, warned the CPA coordinator of the South-Central Region: “Who do you think the young men in Sadr’s Mahdi Army are? They are the unemployed, the men who lost their jobs when the factories here shut down because of the electricity shortage.”^{lxxi} Likewise, popular frustration with government reforms weakened public support overall, which undermined the potential for improved health care, education, and telecommunications to translate into social and political stability.

Justice and Reconciliation

From the start, the CPA was hamstrung by the absence of prewar planning for judicial reform.^{lxxii} Describing the condition of the Iraqi justice system immediately

following the occupation, Clint Williamson, the CPA's responsible senior advisor, reported to Bremer that it "was in a state of almost total devastation at the end of April. Most ministry buildings had suffered extensive damage from looting, and as a result were non-functional."^{lxxiii} The Ministry of Justice in Baghdad "was a burned out shell from which all of the furniture, equipment, and records had been stolen. Of eighteen courthouses in Baghdad, twelve were gutted. Approximately seventy-five percent of the remaining estimated 110 courthouses in Iraq were destroyed as well." "In short," Williamson concluded, "the justice system was completely shut down."^{lxxiv}

The CPA moved quickly to reopen the courts; establish special tribunals; create the basis for an independent judiciary; cleanse the legal statutes of abusive legislation; prepare the Iraqis to handle high-profile cases, such as the trials of Saddam and his principal henchmen; and put in place barriers to official corruption.^{lxxv} While the reforms were impressive, a lack of planning, qualified personnel and sufficient security ultimately limited progress in this area during the fourteen-month existence of the CPA.^{lxxvi} "With the police, we recommended that we leave the administration of justice and law and order in Iraq in Iraqi hands, because we didn't understand the culture, we didn't understand the language, we didn't have a corps of people we could rush there," recalled Frank Miller, who headed the NSC's Iraq group. "We didn't want Americans enforcing the Iraqi law. We did not envision occupation."^{lxxvii} Mr. Miller's statement is indicative of the whole justice and reconciliation process, there was no plan.

Released in February 2004, the Major General Karl Eikenberry's report described CPA training efforts as under- resourced and disorganized, noting in particular that the development of Iraq's police force was so far behind that transferring security

responsibilities would not be possible for many months. Eikenberry's report concluded that the U.S. military should manage the training of Iraq's army and police.

Rule of Law and security go hand in hand, and the disorganized nature in which both were conducted in Iraq is reflective of the outcomes they produced. The CPA had ambitious goals concerning rule of law and were able to meet some of them; however, with an inadequate police force the local populace did not feel as if there was a functioning judiciary. The judiciary was often times afraid to prosecute "criminals" due to their affiliation with corruption or an insurgent element.^{lxxviii}

Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure

Four organizations conducted major reviews of Iraq's infrastructure and economy during the CPA's first three months: Bechtel, United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), the United Nations (UN), and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).^{lxxix} The number one issue they identified was that a lack of security would compromise efforts to rebuild the economy and infrastructure. Despite this warning that economic stabilization would be challenging Ambassador Bremer assured the Iraqi people that: "About one year from now, for the first time in history, every Iraqi in every city, town and village will have as much electricity as he or she can use and he will have it 24 hours a day, every single day."^{lxxx} These type of statements provided unrealistic expectations to the Iraqi people and expectation distort progress.

The CPA did have some positive influence on the economy. They were able to curb inflation, establish a new stable currency and reduce Iraq's debt by eighty percent through international cooperation, this was the largest relief package in history.^{lxxxi} Real

gross domestic product growth in for 2004, the first year after the CPA's arrival, was forty-six percent. This is the second highest growth figure for a comparable period in any of the twenty-two PCR efforts.^{lxxxii} This success is due in large part to the team of experts the Treasury Department sent to work on financial systems. This team served as one of the only sources for sector-specific expertise in the CPA.^{lxxxiii} This is a great example of matching job skills to personnel. Nonetheless, the gap between the results achieved and what the public had come to expect grew over time.

Overall, CPA did not perform well in comparison to The Department of State Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks. CPA performed terribly in security, although security was the military's mission, the policies CPA issued had a negative effect on security. CPA did not perform well in Governance, there was insufficient consideration and poor implementation concerning De-Baatification. CPA performed above average when compared to other PCR efforts in Humanitarian Assistance and Social Well-Being. They brought many of the essential services to pre-war levels; nonetheless, expectations did not meet reality and lack of security had an adverse impact on implementation. CPA did not fare well in Justice and Reconciliation, although courts were open and cases were tried, to include Saddam Hussein, the lack of security and qualified personnel did not allow for CPA's goals to be met. Finally, Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure, CPA performed well, they were able to decrease debt at a historical level and stabilize the currency; however, much like the other essential tasks that showed improvement, CPA was not able to meet all their goals due to lack of security. CPA's difficulties with the essential tasks highlights the importance of security, planning, unity of effort, and resources to successful PCR.

Conclusion

Japan and Iraq present unique lessons concerning the initial stages of reconstruction. Japan is often thought of as the standard bearer as far as United States led reconstruction efforts are concerned. Iraq, however, has not been viewed the same, especially concerning the initial stages of reconstruction. From the perspective of lessons learned, both reconstruction efforts offers excellent learning points for future reconstruction. This conclusion will focus on the impact security, planning, unity of effort and personnel had on SCAP and CPA's ability to execute their reconstruction mission.

The main issue that effected initial reconstruction efforts in Iraq was lack of security for coalition forces and the Iraqi people. The lack of security had devastating effects on infrastructure, economic recovery, governance, and implementation of rule of law. Major General Paul Eaton, Coalition Military Assistance Commander stated:

The U.S. Army was absolutely focused in May [2003] on wrapping up the problem of social mayhem, looting, the lawlessness that occurred, so the Army was absolutely focused on its mission of bringing order to the country...There was zero thought on what the Army could do to develop security forces—zero”^{lxxxiv}

Iraq is the perfect example of what happens when security is not established prior to taking on major reconstruction efforts. Conversely, Japan was on the other end of the spectrum concerning security and post conflict reconstruction. They established security in a seamless effort. In a secured environment the SCAP was able to focus on other important aspects of the reconstruction effort with positive results.

Representative Nita Lowey (D-NY), Chair, House Appropriations Subcommittee on State and Foreign Operations stated during congressional testimony in September 2003, about the lack of preparedness concerning postwar planning in Iraq:

We seem to have transitioned from a cautious beginning to requesting funding for estimates been unrealistic; the entire postwar experience appears to have taken us by surprise. We were told that we would be welcomed with open arms by the Iraqi people and that Iraqi government institutions would be restored after a short hiatus. The vision of postwar reconstruction presented to Congress at that time was for many of us either hopelessly naive or grossly incompetent.^{lxxxv}

The quote by Congresswoman Lowey is very reflective of how Iraq's initial reconstruction was run. The issues with the reconstruction of Iraq start at the strategic level. The true test of any planning process is not whether it accurately predicts each successive turn in the operation, but whether it provides the operators the resources and flexibility to carry out the assigned tasks. The planning process for Iraq did not provide this. The United States had time to plan and many historical reconstruction efforts to draw from. The Department of State worked on a plan two years prior to reconstruction efforts called the "Future of Iraq Project." The project worked with 200 Iraqi exiles and other experts on myriad topics concerning post-conflict Iraq.^{lxxxvi} The Future of Iraq Project would have been an excellent foundation for a plan; however, neither the project nor the people who worked on it were ever part of the Iraq post-conflict planning process. The lack of reconstruction planning for Iraq was felt at every level of the CPA and had a negative impact on all of CPA's efforts.

By contrast, Japan, did have a coherent whole of government plan. The documents

produced by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee planned that the preponderance of military forces would be American, that there would be a single, American Supreme Commander, and that the United States would exercise preeminent influence.⁸⁷ The planners for Japan's reconstruction understood some of the challenges that Germany faced and took the lessons learned and applied them to their plan. Having a well thought out plan, with a whole of government approach is essential to a positive reconstruction effort. This was demonstrated by Japan and Germany. Conversely, Iraq demonstrates the effect a plan done in haste will have on a reconstruction effort. It is essential to reconstruction success to use all our national assets when planning and implementation of reconstruction is concerned.

Unity of effort played an important role in SCAP's success and CPA's failures. SCAP had the full backing of the President, who put his guidance and support in writing. The SCAP was in charge of all the U.S personnel who participated in the occupation and rebuilding. This allowed for all efforts to be focused in the same direction. This also allowed for program changes to occur quickly due to the lack of different efforts by different agencies.

CPA's lack of unity of effort presented major challenges to Ambassador Bremer. His chain of command was convoluted; it switched between the Department of Defense, National Security Agency and the White House. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage recalled an exchange illustrating the murky relationships among the agencies involved in Iraq reconstruction:

One day, in the fall of 2003...we were coming out of the [White House situation] room and Dr. Rice turned to Rumsfeld and I was between the two of them—but she

kind of leaned over...and said, 'Don, would you call Jerry [Bremer] and have him do X, Y, or Z?' And [Rumsfeld] said, 'No, he doesn't work for me.' [Rice] said, 'Yes, he does. Who does he work for?' And [Rumsfeld] said, 'He works for the NSC.' And this is because Rumsfeld found out that Jerry was at least communicating with—if not taking instructions from—the National Security Advisor.^{lxxxviii}

Ambassador Bremer also had unity of effort challenges within Iraq. The U.S. military, USAID and other agencies were working on their own agendas and often times ran counter to what the CPA was trying to accomplish. On one occasion the U.S. Marines were about to run an election that the CPA asked them to stop due to election laws not being in place.^{lxxxix} Clarifying responsibilities and working relations proved a tough challenge for the CPA and had a negative impact on the reconstruction effort.

Finally, resources, specifically, the lack of qualified personnel to carry out reconstruction efforts played a major role in the initial struggles of the CPA. From a personnel perspective the lessons learned from Iraq are as beneficial as those learned from Japan. SCAP was well staffed, from a military and civilian perspective, with both cultural and section specific experts. SCAP's staff proved instrumental in allowing SCAP to meet their goals. CPA was never well staffed and never had the right mix of job skills for the different elements of reconstruction. CPA's lack of personnel did not have as big an impact as lack of security, but it had a serious impact on CPA's ability to meet their lofty goals.

Undoubtedly, conflicts will continue; as Haiti demonstrates other than war reconstruction will continue as well. The same principles will continue to apply:

establish civil security, establish civil control, restore essential services, support governance and lastly support economic infrastructure development.^{xc} Within the framework of the essential tasks, planning, unity of effort and resources will continue to be paramount to success. The United States is a world leader and will continue to provide relief and stability to different regions of the world. The lessons learned in Japan and Iraq will continue to serve as valuable resources when planning for future reconstruction projects.

ⁱ Dobbins, James, John G. McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth G. Jones, Rollie Lal, Andrew Rathmell, Rachel Swanger, and Anga Timilsina. *America's Role In Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq*. (California: Rand, 2003) 51

ⁱⁱ Mayer, Sydney, *MacArthur in Japan*. (New York, Ballantine Books, 1973) 13

ⁱⁱⁱ Dobbins, James, Seth G. Jones, Benjamin Runkle, Siddharth Mohandas. *Occupying Iraq: A History of the Coalition of Provisional Authority*. (Pittsburg, PA: Rand Corp., 2009)11

^{iv} Dobbins Nation Building 25-30

^v Dobbins Nation Building 25-30

^{vi} Dobbins. Nation Building 25-29

^{vii} Martin, Edwin, *The Allied Occupation of Japan*. (Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1948). 6-13

^{viii} Headquarter U.S Army. *Stability Operations FM 3-07*, Department of the Army, (Washington DC: Headquarters U.S. Army, October 2008). 2-10

^{ix} Dobbins Nation Building 26-28

^x Dobbins Nation Building 34

^{xi} Harries, Meiron, Susie Harries, *Sheathing the Sword: The Demolition of Japan*. (New York, Macmillan Publishing, 1987) 20

^{xii} Dobbins Nation Building 50

^{xiii} FM 3-07 2-8

^{xiv} FM 3-07 2-8

^{xv} Harries 44

^{xvi} Martin 54-59

^{xvii} Dobbins Nation Building 43-45

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xxxviii Dobbins Nation Building 40
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xl Mayer 17
- xli Harries 133
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